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Abstract
In Crypto Damgard showed that any constantround protocol in which the
verier sends only independent random bits and which is zeroknowledge against
the honest verier can be transformed into a protocol for the same problem that is
zeroknowledge in general His transformation was based on the interactive hashing
technique of Naor Ostrovsky Venkatesan and Yung and thus the resulting protocol
had very large roundcomplexity
We adopt Damgard	s methods using ordinary hashing functions instead of the
abovementioned interactive hashing technique Typically the protocols we derive
have much lower roundcomplexity than those derived by Damgard	s transformation
As in Damgard	s transformation our transformation preserves statistical
perfect
zeroknowledge and does not rely on any computational assumptions However un
like Damgard	s transformation the new transformation is not applicable to argument
systems or to proofs of knowledge
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Zeroknowledge proof systems introduced by Goldwasser Micali and Racko  are a key
tool in the design of cryptographic protocols	 The results of Goldreich Micali and Wigder
son 
 guarantee that such proof systems can be constructed for any NPstatement pro
vided that oneway functions exist	 However the general construction presented in 

and subsequent works may yield quite inecient proof systems for particular applications
of interest	 Thus developing methodoligies for the design of zeroknowledge proofs is still
of interest	
Designing proof systems which are merely zeroknowledge with respect to the honest
verier i	e	 the verier specied for the system is much easier than constructing proof
systems which are zeroknowledge in general i	e	 with respect to any ecient strategy of
trying to extract knowledge from the specied prover	 For example the simple round
interactive proof for Graph NonIsomorphism   is zeroknowledge with respect to the honest
verier	 Yet cheating veriers may extract knowledge from this system and a nontrivial
modication which utilizes proofs of knowledge and increases the number of rounds is
required to make it zeroknowledge in general	 Likewise assuming the existence of one
way function there exist constantround interactive proofs for any NPlanguage which are
zeroknowledge with respect to the honest verier	 Yet constantround interactive proofs
for NP which are zeroknowledge in general are known only under seemingly stronger
assumptions and are also more complex cf	 	
In view of the relative simplicity of designing protocols which are zeroknowledge with
respect to the honest verier a transformation of such protocols into protocols which are
zeroknowledge in general i	e	 wrt any verier may be very valuable	 Assuming various
intractability assumptions such transformations have been presented by Bellare et	 al	 

and Ostrovsky et	 al	 	 A transformation which does not rely on any intractability
assumptions has been presented by Damgard in Crypto	 His transformation of honest
verier zeroknowledge into general zeroknowledge has two shortcomings	 Firstly it
can be applied only to constantround protocols of the ArthurMerlin type i	e	 in which
the veriers messages are uniformly distributed in the set of strings of specied length	
Secondly the transformation produces protocols of very high round complexity specically
the round complexity of the resulting protocol is linear in the randomness complexity of
the original one	
In this paper we improve the round complexity of Damgards transformation while
preserving the class of interactive proos to which it can be applied	 Our transformation
 To be convinced that G and G  are not isomorphic the verier randomly selects n random isomorphic
copies of each graph randomly shues all these copies together and asks the prover to specify the origin
of each copy

only increases the number of rounds by a factor of two	 However it also increase the error
probability of the proof system by a nonnegligible amount which can be made arbitrarily
small	 This increase is inevitible in view of a result of Goldreich and Krawcyzk   see
discussion in subsection 		 Thus to get proof systems with negligible error probability
one may repeat the protocols resulting from our transformation a nonconstant number of
times	 Still the resulting proof systems will have much lower round complexity than those
resulting from Damgards transformation	
We preserve some of the positive properties of Damgards transformation	 In particular
our transformation does not rely on any computational assumptions and preserves perfect
and almostperfect zeroknowledge	 However unlike Damgards transformation the new
transformation is not applicable to argument systems i	e	 the BCC model  or to proofs
of knowledge	
Our transformation builds on Damgards work 	 In his transformation the random
messages sent by the verier in each round are replaced by a multiround interactive
hashing protocol which in turn originates in the work of Naor Ostrovsky Venkatesan
and Yung 	 Instead in our transformation the random messages sent by the verier
are replaced by a  
round protocol called Random Selection	 The Random Selection
protocol uses a family of ordinary hashing functions specically we use a family of twise
indepedent functions for some parameter t which is certainly polynomial in the input	
We believe that the Random Selection protocol may be of independent interest	 Thus a
few words are in place	 The goal of this protocol is to allow two parties to select a random
nbit string	 There is a parameter  which governs the quality of this selection and the
requirement is asymmetric with respect to the two parties	 Firstly it is required that if
the rst party follows the protocol then no matter how its counterpart plays the output
of the protocol will be at most  away in norm from uniform	 Secondly it is required
that if the second party follows the protocol then no matter how its counterpart plays no
string will appear as output of the protocol with probability greater than polyn    
 n	
Our Random Selection protocol has the additional property of being simulatable in the
sense that given a possible outcome it is easy to generate a random transcript of the
protocol which ends with this outcome	
Other Related Work
The idea of transforming honest verier zeroknowledge into zeroknowledge in general
was rst studied by Bellare Micali and Ostrovsky 
	 Their transformation needed a
computational assumption of a specic algebraic type	 Since then several constructions
have reduced the computational assumptions needed	 The latest in this line of work is
by Ostrovsky Venkatesan and Yung  who give a transformation which is based on


interactive hashing and preserved statistical zeroknowledge	 Their transformation relies on
existence of a oneway permutation	 The transformation works for any protocol provided
that the verier is probabilistic polynomialtime	
An indirect way of converting protocols which are zeroknowledge with respect to the
honest verier into ones which are zeroknowledge in general is available through a recent
result of Ostrovsky and Wigderson 	 They have proved that the existence of honest
verier zeroknowledge proof system for a language which is hard on the average implies
the existence of oneway functions	 Combined with the results of 
 and   this
yields a computational and general zeroknowledge proof for the same language	 Thus
computational honestverier zeroknowledge interactive proofs for hard on the average
languages get transformed into computational zeroknowledge interactive proofs for these
languages	 However perfect honestverier zeroknowledge proofs for such languages do
not get transformed into perfect zeroknowledge proofs	
A twoparty protocol for random selection with unrelated properties has been pre
sented in 	 This protocol guarantees that as long as one party plays honestly the






    polylog 	
Another twoparty protocol for random selection with other unrelated properties has
been presented in 	 Loosely speaking this protocol allows a computationally restricted
party interacting with a powerful and yet untrustful party to uniformly select an element
in an easily recognizable set S  f  gn	
 Some Remarks Concerning Denitions
We assume that the reader is familiar with the various denitions of interactive proofs
i	e	 the GMR model	 Below we merely point out some less familiar denitions that we
are going to use	
Following many works we denote by P V x a random variable representing the
transcript of the interaction between prover P and verier V  on common input x	
In this paper we use a somewhat nonstandard denition of zeroknowledge	 This
denition is very convenient for our purposes	 Furthermore we believe that it is nicer in
general	 Below we present only the honestverier variant of perfect zeroknowledge	 We
trust the reader to generate the other variants by himselfherself	
Denition  perfect zeroknowledge wrt honest verier Let P V  be an interactive
proof for language L We say that P is perfect zeroknowledge with respect to the honest
verier if there exists a probabistic polynomialtime machine M and a positive polynomial
p so that for every x  L

 with probability at least  pjxj on input x machine M halts with output other
wise it halts with no output
 given that on input x machine M halts with output the output is distributed identi
cally to P V x
In the above denition we require M to run in strictly polynomailtime whereas the
traditional denition allows it to run in expected polynomialtime	 However unlike in the
traditional denition we allow the machine to stop without output	 All we require is that
with nonnegligible probability the machine stops with output	 Clearly the new denition
implies the traditional one since we can repeatedly invoke a strict simulator untill it stops
with output	 Also most zeroknowledge proofs can be show zeroknowledge also under
the new denition	 However we do not know if the traditional denition implies the new
one in general	 Actually we believe that it does not	 In case the reader is concerned of this
issue heshe can augment the above denition by allowing the simulator both to run in
expected polynomialtime and still have output only with nonnegligible probability	 This
augmented denition is clearly equivalent to the traditional one and yet is somewhat more
convenient for our purposes	
For the purpose of a motivating discussion in subsection 	 we use the notion of
blackbox zeroknowledge	 Loosely speaking blackbox zeroknowledge is a strengthening
of the ordinary notion of zeroknowledge	 Recall that ordinary zeroknowledge means
that the interaction of the prover with any ecient verier can be eciently simulated	
Thus this denition allows to use a dierent simulator for each verier and furthermore
make no requirement regarding the relation among the various simulators	 For blackbox
zeroknowledge we require that there exists a universal simulator which given access to any
ecient verier can simulate the interaction of the prover with this verier	 For further
details  see  	
 Random Selection
We consider a randomized twoparty protocol for selecting strings	 The two parties to the
protocol are called the challenger and the responder	 These names are supposed to reect
the asymmetric requirements presented below as well as the usage of the protocol in our
zeroknowledge transformation	 Loosely speaking we require that
This includes for example the perfect zeroknowledge proofs for Graph Isomorphismand the computa
tional zeroknowledge proofs for NP but not the perfect zeroknowledge proof for Graph NonIsomorphism


 if the challenger follows the protocol then no matter which strategy is used by the
responder the output of the protocol is almost uniformly distributed
 if the responder follows the protocol then no string may appear with probability
much greater than its probability under the uniform distribution	 Furthermore for
any string which may appear as output when an arbitrary challenger strategy is
used one can eciently generate a random transcript of that protocol ending with
this output	
We postpone the formal specication of these properties to the analysis of the protocol
presented below	 Actually we present two version of the protocol	
Construction  Random Selection Protocol  two versions Let n and m  n be
integers and Hnm be a family of functions each mapping the set of nbit long strings
onto the set of mbit long strings
C the challenger uniformly selects h  Hnm and sends it to the responder
R  version  the responder uniformly selects x  f  gn computes   hx and
sends  to the challenger
 version 
 the responder uniformly selects   f  gm and sends it to the
challenger
C the challenger uniformly selects a preimage of  under h and outputs it
We remark that if version  is used and both parties follow the protocol then the output
is uniformly distributed in f  gn	 However the interesting case is when one of the parties
deviates from the protocol	 In this case the protocol can be guaranteed to produce good
output provided that good families of hash functions are being used as Hnm	 These
functions must have relatively succient representation as well as strong random properties	
Furthermore given a function h it should be easy to evaluate h on a given image and to
generate a random preimage of a given range element under h	 Using the algorithmic
properties of Hnm it follows that the instructions specied in the above protocol can be
implemented in probabilistic polyn time which for    polyn means polyntime	
Construction  Preferred family H tnm Let n m  n and t  polyn be integers
We associate f  gn with the nite eld GF 
n and consider the set of t  degree
In particular we will use m
def
 n  log
n where  is an errorbound parameter
We stress that each function in Hnm rages over all f g
m Thus the challenger may always respond
in step C even if the responder deviates from the protocol or version  is used

polynomials over this eld For each such polynomial f  we consider the function h so
that for every x  f  gn hx is the m most signicant bits of fx The family H tnm
consists of all such functions h The canonical description of a function h  H tnm is
merely the sequence of t smallest coe	cients of the corresponding polynomial Finaly we
modify the functions in H tnm so that for each h  H
t
nm and every x




In the sequel we will use the family Hnm
def
 Hnnm	 We now list the following easy to
verify properties of the above family	
P There is a polyntime algorithm that on input a function h  H tnm and a string
x  f  gn outputs hx	
P The number of preimages of an image y under h  H tnm is bounded above by 

n m  
t furthermore there exists a poly
n mttime algorithm that on input y and h
outputs the set h  y
def
 fx hxyg	 The algorithm works by trying all possible
extensions of y to an element of GF 
t for each such extension it remains to nd
the roots of a degree t  polynomial over the eld	
P H tnm is a family of almost twise independent hashing functions in the following sense
for every t distinct images x   xt  f  g
n  f  gm n m for a uniformly cho
sen h  H tnm the random variables hx   hxt are indepedently and uniformly
distributed in f  gm	
 The output distribution for honest challeger
We now turn to analyze the output distribution of the above protocol assuming that
the challenger plays according to the protocol	 In the analysis we allow the responder to
deviate arbitrarily from the protocol and thus as far as this analysis goes the two versions
in Construction  are equivalent	 The analysis is done using the random properties of








We say that X is away from Y if the statistical dierence between them is 	
Proposition  Let n be an integer      and m
def
 n   logn  Suppose that
Hnm is a family of almost nwise independent hashing functions Then no matter which
strategy is used by the responder provided that the challenger follows the protocol the
output of the protocol is at most 
 
 naway from uniform distribution

proof Recall that an equivalent denition of the statistical dierence between two random
variables X and Y  is
max
S
fjProbX S ProbY Sjg
In our case one random variable is the output of the protocol whereas the other is uniformly
distributed	 Thus it suces to upper bound the dierence between the probability that
the output hits an arbitrary set S and the density of S in f  gn	 Furthermore it suces
to consider sets S of density greaterequal to one half i	e	 jSj      

n	 Let us denote
by   Hnm  f  gm an arbitrary strategy employed by the responder	 Then under
the conditions of the proposition the output of the protocol uniformly distributed in the
random set h  h where h is uniformly selected in Hnm	 Thus for a set S the







For an arbitrarily xed set S we can bound the expression in Eq	  by considering the











	 Whenever this event occurs Eq	  is in the interval  
S   

 and so the statistical dierence is at most 
	 Thus it remains to upper bound
the probability that the above event does not hold	 We rst note that when estimating
the cardinality of the sets h   and h   	 S we may ignore the contribution of the
preimages in f  gm n m since there is at most one such elements i	e	  n m	 Fixing
an arbitrary  and using the tmoment method with t  n we get
ProbhHnm



















Thus with overwhelmingly high probability jh   	 Sj    S   
n m for all
  f  gm	 By a similar argument with overwhelmingly high probability jh  j 
     
n m for all   f  gm	 Thus with overwhelmingly high probability i	e	 at
least   
 n the event in Eq	 
 holds	

 The output distribution for honest responder
We now show that no matter what strategy is used by the challenger if the responder
follows the protocol then the set of possible outputs of the protocol must constitute a non
negligible fraction of the set of nbit long strings	 This claim holds for both versions of
Construction 	 Furthermore we show that no single string may appear with probability
which is much more than 
 n i	e	 its probability weight under the uniform distribution	
Proposition  Suppose that Hnm  H tnm is a family of hashing functions satisfying
property 
P for some t  polyn Let C be an arbitrary challenger strategy Then
for every x  f  gn the probability that an execution of version  of the protocol with
challenger strategy C ends with output x is at most t   
n m   
 n
proof We consider an arbitrary probabilistic strategy for the challenger denoted C	
Without loss of generality we may assume that the rst message of this strategy is an
element of Hnm messages violating this convention are treatedinterpreted as a xed
function h  Hnm	 Similarly we may assume that the second message of the challenger
given partial history h  is an element of h   again messages violating this con
vention are interpreted as say the lexicographically rst element of h  	 Finally it
suces to consider deterministic strategies for the challenger since given a probabilistic
strategy C we can uniformly select a sequence r respresenting the outcome of the coin





We now upper bound the probability that an execution of the protocol with challenger
strategy c ends with output x	 We denote by h
def
 c the rst message of strategy c	 Now
the protocol may end with output x only if the responder chose the message 
def
 hx	
Thus the probability that the responder choose  is exactly jfx  hx  gj   
 n	 By
property P
 for each h  Hnm and   f  gm the cardinality of the set h   is at
most t   
n m	 The proposition follows	
Proposition  Let C be an arbitrary challenger strategy Then for every x  f  gn
the probability that an execution of version  of the protocol with challenger strategy C ends
with output x is at most 
 m Furthermore for every deterministic challenger strategy c
exactly 
m strings may appear as output each with probability exactly 
 m
proof Fix a deterministic strategy c and a string x  f  gn	 As in the previous proof
we may assume that h
def
 c  Hnm and c  h  	 Denoting h
def
 c version 

terminates with output x if and only if the responder chooses the message 
def
 hx and
x  c	 Since  is selected uniformly in f  gm the proposition follows	

 Simultability property of the protocol
We conclude the analysis of the above protocol by showing that one can eciently generate
random transcripts of the protocol having this output	 Throughout this analysis we
assume that the responder follows the instruction specied by the protocol	 As in the proof
of the last two propositions it suces to consider an arbitrary deterministic challenger
strategy denoted c	
Now suppose that Hnm  H tnm is a family of hashing functions satisfying property
P for some t  polyn	 Then on input x and access to a function c f  g f  g
we can easily test if chx  x where h
def
 c	 In case the above condition holds the
triple h hx x is the only transcript of the execution of the protocol with challenger
strategy c which ends with output x	 Otherwise there is no execution of the protocol
with challenger strategy c which ends with output x	 Thus
Proposition  Consider executions of the Random Selection protocol in which the chal
lenger strategy denoted c is an arbitrary function and the responder plays according to
the protocol There exists a polynomialtime oracle machine that on input x  f  gn and
h  Hnm and oracle access to a function c either generates the unique transcript of a
cexecution which outputs x or indicates that no such execution exists
 Setting the Parameters
Proposition  motivates us to set  the parameter governing the approximation of the
output in case of honest challenger as small as possible	 On the other hand Propositions 

and  motivates us to maintain the dierence nm small and in paricular logarithmic in
n	 Recalling that n  m   logn  this suggests setting    pn for some xed
positive polynomial p	
 The ZeroKnowledge Transformation
Our transformation is restricted to interactive proofs in which the verier sends the out
come of every coin it tosses	 Such interactive proofs are called ArthurMerlin games 
or publiccoins interactive proofs cf	 	 Note that in such interactive proofs the veri
er moves save the last may consist merely of tossing coins and sending their outcome	
In its last move the verier decides based on the entire history of the communication
whether to accept the input or not	 Without loss of generality we may assume that in
every round of such an interactive proof the verier tosses at least  logjxj  coins where
x is the common input to the interactive proof and  species the desired bound on the

statistical distance between one round in the resulting interactive proof and the original
one	 Furthermore assume for sake of simplicity that at each round the verier tosses the
same number of coins denoted n	
 The Transformation
In the following description we use the second version of the Random Selection protocol
presented in Construction 	 This simplies the construction of the simulator for the
transformed interactive proof	 The rst version can be used as well at the expense of
some modication in the simulator construction	
The protocol transformation consists of replacing each verier move except the last
decision move by an execution of the Random Selection protocol in which the verier
plays the role of the challenger and the prover plays the role of the responder	 Thus
each round of the original interactive proof consisting of a random message sent by the
verier followed by a respond of the prover is relaced by two rounds in which the three
rst messages are of the Random Selection protocol and the fourth message is the prover
respond	 Namely
Construction  transformation of round i in P V  interaction Let P V  be an in
teractive proof system in which the verier V only uses public coins let n   polyn




 n logn n and
Hnm be as specied in Construction  for t  n The ith round of the P V  interaction
on common input x is replaced by the following two rounds of the resulting interactive proof
P  V  Let h    r  	   hi   ai   ri   	i   be the history so far of the interaction
between prover P  and verier V  Then the next two rounds consist of an execution of
the second version of the Random Selection protocol follows by P  mimicing the response
of P  Namely in the rst round the verier V  uniformly selects hi  Hnm and sends it
to the prover P  who replies with ai uniformly selected in f  g
m In the second round
the verier V  uniformly selects ri  h
  
i ai and sends it to the prover P
 who replies with
	i
def
 P x r   ri
The nal decision of the new verier V  mimics the one of the original verier V 
namely
V h    r  	   ht at rt 	t  V r  	   rt 	t
 Preservation of Completeness and Soundness
In this subsection we may assume that V  follows the interactive proof	 Thus if for some
x  f  g prover P always convinces V on common input x then P  always convinces
 
V  on this common input	 We stress that both V  and P  run in polynomialtime when
given oracle access to V and P  respecitely	 Thus the new verier is a legitimate one	
Furthermore if the original prover P  working in polynomialtime with help of a suitable
auxiliary input could convince the original verier to accept some common input then
the resulting prover P  could do the same i	e	 can convince V  to accept this common
input while working in polynomialtime with help of the same auxiliary input	
We have just seen that the completeness properties of the original interactive proof is
preserved by the transformation in a strong sense	 Soundness properties are preserved as
well but with some slackness which results from the imperfectness of the Random Selection
protocol	 In particular
Proposition  Let 
  f  g     be a function bounding the probability that verier
V accepts inputs when interacting with any possibly cheating prover Namely 
x is a
bound on the probability that V accepts x Suppose that on input x the interactive proof




x Otjxj  jxj is a function bounding
the probability that verier V  accepts inputs when interacting with any possibly cheating
prover
proof Recall that V  plays the role of the challenger in the Random Selection protocol	
Thus the proposition follows quite immediately from Proposition 	
We stress that the above proposition remains valid no matter which of the two version
of Random Selection is used	 The same holds with respect to the comments regarding
completeness made above	
 ZeroKnowledge
In this subsection we may assume that P  follows the interactive proof	 Assuming that P
is zeroknowledge with respect to the verier V  we prove that P  is zeroknowledge with
respect to any probabilistic polynomialtime verier strategy	 Furthermore this state
ment holds for the three versions of zeroknowledge specically perfect almostperfect
statistical and computational zeroknowledge	
Proposition 	 Let P V  be a constantround ArthurMerlin interactive proof Suppose
that P is perfect resp	 almostperfect resp	 computational zeroknowledge with respect
to the honest verier V over the set L  f  g Then P  is perfect resp	 almostperfect
resp	 computational zeroknowledge with respect to any probabilistic polynomailtime
verier over the set L  f  g

proof Let M be a simulator witnessing the hypothesis of the proposition	 We start by
considering the case of perfect zeroknowledge	 Then for every x  L with nonnegligible
probabilityMx halts with output and given that this happens the output is distributed
identically to P V x	 For every verier strategy V  interacting with P  we construct a
simulator M as follows	 Again by uniformly selecting and xing coin tosses for V  we
may assume that V  is deterministic	
The Simulator M On input x the simulator invokes M and assuming Mx halts with
output sets r  	   rt 	t
def
 Mx otherwise M also halts with no output	 The sim
ulator M now tries to form transcripts of the Random Selection protocol which end with
output r  r through rt respectively	 Here we use the simulatability of the Random Se
lection protocol	 A transcript with output r  is formed as follows	 M feeds V  with input
x and obtains h  which can be assumed as in Propositions 
 and  to be in Hnm	 Next
M computes a   h r  and feeds V  with x a 	 If V  replies with r  weve succeeded
in forming a transcript for the rst invokation of Random Selection and we proceed to
the next	 Otherwise M halts with no output	 We note that for the next invokations of
Random Selection V  is fed with the entire history so far for example to obtain h we
feed V  with x a  	  and next we feed it with x a  	  a where a  hr	 If all t
rounds were completed successfullyM halts with output h  a  r  	   ht at rt 	t	
The following observation which follows from Proposition  simplies our analysis	 Suppose
that r  	   rt 	t is a transcript of a P V  interaction on common input x	 Then
there exists at most one P  V xtranscript that matches it	 Namely there is a unique
sequence of his and ais so that h   V x a   h r  h  V x a  	  a  hr
and so on	 It follows that once M has output a transcript the entire operation of M is
determined	 In particular all invokations of V  are on inputs which are already determined	
The above construction will be used also in case of almostperfect and computational
zeroknowledge	 However we start by analyzing it in case of perfect zeroknowledge	 The
next two claims establish that P  is perfect zeroknowledge in this case	
Claim  If M perfectly simulates P V  then M produces output with nonnegligible
probability i	e	 there exists a positive polynomial p such that for every x on input x
machineM produces output with probability at least  pjxj	
proof It suces to bound the fraction of rs which appear as output of the Random
Selection protocol when the challenger uses strategy V  with adequately added auxiliary
inputs i	e	 x for the rst invokation x a  	  for the second and so on	 By Proposition 
and the setting of the parameters in the construction of P  V  it follows that this fraction
is bounded by a nonnegligible function of jxj denoted fjxj	 Thus Mx produces an
output with probability at least pjxj   fjxjt where pjxj is a lower bound on the


probability that Mx produces output	 The claim follows	  
Claim  If the output distributionMx equals the distribution P V x then the output
distribution Mx equals the distribution P  V x	
proof Consider a generic transcript h  a  r  	   ht at rt 	t in the support of either
distributions i	e	 Mx or P  V x	 As always such a transcript is totally deter
mined by the prover messages namely the subtranscript a  	   at 	t	 We rst prove
that the subtranscript a   at appears with equal probability in both distributions
specically it appears with probability 
 mt in both	
 For the distribution P  V x this is obvious by the denition of Random Selection
version 
	
 For the distribution Mx we note that the subtranscript a   at appears in
an output only if ris used to produce it see construction of M
 meet a condition
that can be satised by exactly one sequence of ris i	e	 if r   V x a  r 
V x a  	  a and so on	 By the fact that M perfectly simulates P V  it follows
that the ris are uniformly distributed	
Thus each a   at subtranscript appear with the same probability in both distributions
Mx and P  V x	 Now using again the fact that M perfectly simulates P V  we
conclude that each a  	   at 	t subtranscript appear with the same probability in the
two distributions	  
This concludes our treatment of perfect zeroknowledge	 In the other cases i	e	 almost
perfect and computational zeroknowledge we use the same simulatorM and adapt the
analysis as follows	 We start with the case of almostperfect zeroknowledge where again
we use a pair of claims to establish the validity of the simulation	
Claim  If the output distribution ensemble fMxgxL is statistically close to the en
semble fP V xgxL then M produces output with nonnegligible probability	
proof sketch The proof follows by an adaptation of the proof of Claim 	 The key obser
vation is that a distribution which is statistically close to uniform here we refer to the
sequence of ris produced by M must hit a nonnegligible fraction of the sequences here
we refer to the ris produced by Random Selection with V  with nonnegligible probability	
 
Claim  Let M be as in Claim 	 Then the output distribution ensemble fMxgxL is
statistically close to the ensemble fP  V xgxL
Recall that V   is determinitic

proof sketch We repeat the argument of Claim 
 noting that all equality assertions should
be replaced by statistical closeness	 Specically the ris can not be guaranteed to be
uniformly distributed but rather statistically close to such a distribution	 It follows that
the distribution of ais in the output of the simulation is statistically close to uniform	
Note that the statistical dierence between the ais and the uniform distribution may
be larger by a polynomial factor than the corresponding dierence observed on the ris
but still this is negligible	 Similarly we can argue that the augmentation by the 	is is
statistically close rather than equal in the two distributions	  
Finally we deal with the most complicated case namely the case of computational zero
knowledge	 The following pair of claims is a computational analogue of the previous pair	
Claim  Suppose that the output distribution ensemble fMxgxL is computationally
indistinguishable from the ensemble fP V xgxL	 Then M produces output with non
negligible probability	
proof sketch The proof follows by an adaptation of the proof of Claim 	 Here we note that
a distribution which is computationally indistinguishable from the uniform distribution
i	e	 the sequence of ris produced by M must hit a polynomialtime recognizable set
i	e	 the set of ris produced by Random Selection with V  with probability which may
dier from the density of the recognizable set by at most a negligible amount	 Thus if
the recoginzable set has nonnegligible density as is the case here then it must be hit with
nonnegligible probability	  
Claim  Let M be as in Claim 	 Then the output distribution ensemble fMxgxL is
computationally indistinguishable from the ensemble fP  V xgxL	
proof sketch Here making claims regarding the output distribution of M requires a sim
ulation argument	 Specically assume towards contradiction that there exists an al
gorithm denoted D that can distinguish the output distribution of fMxgxL from
the distribution ensemble fP  V xgxL	 Then we can construct an algorithm D that
can distinguish the output distribution of fMxgxL from the distribution ensemble
fP V xgxL in contradiction to the hypothesis regarding M 	 Given a P V transcript
from either distributions algorithm D produces a P  V transcript by employing the
same construction as M specically by tring to simulate the Random Selection protocol	
Clearly for the P V x distribution this must succeeds with nonnegligible probability	
Also the success probability on theMx distribution must be very close otherwise we im
midiately get a distinguisher	 Observe that the extended transcripts produced from the the
P V x distribution are distributed alike P  V x whereas the extended transcripts
produced from the the Mx distribution are distributed alike Mx	 Thus invoking D
on the extended transcript produced as specied allows us to distinguish the two indis

tinguishable ensembles fMxgxL and fP V xgxL in contradiction to the hypothesis	
 
Thus in all three cases considered the corresponding zeroknowledge claim holds	
We remark that the above proposition remains valid even if one uses the rst version of the
Random Selection protocol	 However a slightly more complex simulator will have to be
used	 The reason being that in the rst version of the Random Selection protocol the ais
are not selected uniformly but are rather weighted by the number of their preimages under
the corresponding his	 Thus ris which are mapped to ais with small preimage may be
less likely in the real interactions	 To compensate for this phenomenon one maymodify the
simulator so that it skews the probabilities in the same manner	 Namely when producing
a transcript with less likely ris the simulator will discard it with some probability	 The
required probability with which to discard transcripts can be easily computed	
 Conclusions
Combining Propositions  and  we get
Theorem  Let 
  N    Suppose L has a constantround ArthurMerlin proof
system with error bound 
 which is perfect resp	 almostperfect resp	 computational
zeroknowledge with respect to the honest verier Then for every positive polynomial p 







which is perfect resp	 almostperfect resp	 computational zeroknowledge with respect
to any probabilistic polynomialtime verier Furthermore the zeroknowledge property
can be demonstrated using a blackbox simulation Also if the original system had no error
on inputs in L then the same holds for the new system
Theorem  does not preserve the error probability of the original system	 This seems
inevitible in light of  	 Recall that there are languages believed not to be in BPP
which have constantround ArthurMerlin proof systems with exponentially small error
probability which are zeroknowledge with respect to the honest verier	 For example
Graph Isomorphism has such a system for perfect zeroknowledge and assuming the
existence of oneway functions every language in NP has such a system for compu
tational zeroknowledge 
	 Now a stronger version of Theorem  say one in which

n
n is a negligible function of n would imply that these languages have constant
round ArthurMerlin balckbox zeroknowledge proof systems with negligible error prob
ability	 But according to   languages having constantround ArthurMerlin balck
box zeroknowledge proof systems lie in BPP	 Needless to say that NP and even Graph
NonIsomorphism are believed not to lie in BPP	

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